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Thestudy reported in this paper uses a microsimulation model to
estimate the effects of alternative national health insurance
policies. Unlike previous microsimulation studies, the current
analysis uses an explicit model of the supply and price response in
the markets for hospital care and physicians' services. Indeed, two
quite different models of suppiy and price response are examined
and their implications are contrasted.
A microsimulation model of household demand is necessary if
the analysis is to provide useful results in the comparison of
specific health insurance proposals. The effects of alternative
national health insurance policies depend crucially on the stochas-
tic character of health care demand. More specifically, the effects of
The methods and programs used in this paper were developed in a project supported by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The model in Section 1 was described in an
unpublished technical report, "National Health Insurance Simulation Model" (August 1972),
and the methods in Sections 2 and 4 were described in "Supply and Price Response in National
Health Insurance Analysis" (September 1972). We are grateful to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare for its support of this research and to B. Mitchell, C. Moyer, and
D. Schenker for useful discussions.
505different sets of deductibles, coinsurance rates, and other parame-
ters of insurance policies depend on particular stochastic distribu-
tions of health expenditures. Aggregate specification of demand
behavior cannot capture the subtle differences in the response of
demand to different types of insurance policies. The current inves-
tigation uses a stochastic simulation model of demand based on the
actual experience of more than 300,000 families. The basic demand
model, described in detail in Section 1, is an extension of the simple
aggregate health care demand model used in Feldstein, Friedman,
and Luft (1972).
A serious weakness of all previous microsimulation studies of
national health insurance, including our own (1972), has been the
neglect of the supply and price response to national health
insurance. current analysis shows how an aggregate model of
supply and price response can be combined with a microsimulation
model of demand. Although there are no explicit aggregate demand
equations, the complete model is solved for prices that equate
supply and demand. The supply model and the method of finding
the equilibrium are described in Section 2. Some illustrative results
are then presented in Section 3.
The supply and price response of sections.2 and 3 is based on the
simplest model of aggregate supply and the assumption of market
clearing equilibrium. The markets for hospital care and for physi-
cians' services may not behave in this way. Hospital prices may rise
in response to increases in demand because hospitals change the
nature of their product and not because it is more expensive to
produce a larger quantity of the old product. Physicians may
increase prices in response to greater demand or increased insur-
ance without setting a market clearing price. Section 4 develops a
model with these characteristics, describes the simultaneous in-
teraction of demand with this supply behavior, and presents some
illustrative results.
Most of the debate about the effects of national health insurance
has focused on the uncertainty about the responsiveness of house-
hold demand. The current study shows that our uncertainty about
supply response may be even more important.
1.A MICROSIMULATION MODEL OF DEMAND
Theannual health care expenditures of a group of families with the
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can be described by a joint frequency distribution of expenditures
on hospital services and medical services. Each such distribution is
conditional on the gross prices charged for hospital and physician
services. Let Em Ph,Pm)be such a distribution for insurance
coverage i with:
=family'stotal expenditure for hospital services
Em =family'stotal expenditure for medical services
Ph= grossprice per unit of hospital services
Pm =grossprice per unit of medical services
There is an associated distribution of net out-of-pocket expense
G'(N Pm)that is related to F' by the insurance reimbursement
formula.
The expenditure distribution associated with any particular in-
surance structure and prices is derived from a "baseline" quantity
distribution that would prevail in the absence of any insurance and
with prices equal to unity: F°(Xh,Xm Ph1,Pm =1).There is, of
course, a different baseline expenditure distribution for each family
type. A specific national health insurance proposal can be de-
scribed in terms of the deductibles, coinsurance rates, and
maximum net out-of-pocket expenditure for each type of family. Dh
and Dm will be used to denote the deductibles, C,, and Cm the
coinsurance rates, and MAX the maximum net out-of-pocket ex-
penditure.
The equations relating expenditure in the presence of insurance
to the baseline distribution and the prevailing gross prices is an
extension of a traditional constant elasticity demand model. The
most appropriate way to extend a constant elasticity specification to
deal with deductibles and a maximum net spending limit is
uncertain. One approach, offered as a tentative specification until
better empirical evidence is available, assumes a constant elasticity
of the quantity demanded with respect to the net price paid for
expenditures over the deductible. The net price of an additional
unit of hospital care depends on the family's current level of
expenditure. More generally, the net price paid by the family
depends on (1) the gross price charged by the hospital (Ph),(2)the
effective coinsurance rate (1 for expenditures below the deductible,
(C,,) between the deductible and the maximum net expenditure
limit, and 0 above that limit) and (3) a parameter, X, representing
the nonmonetary costs (Acton, 1972; Phelps and Newhouse, 1972)
to the consumer of health services.
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Ifthere were no deductibles (Dh =Dm=0) and no maximum net CasejjjIf expenditure (MAX=the two expenditure equations would be:
E
Ph(Ch + x)][Pm(Cm +A)] (a) Eh =Dh
(1)
E
Ph(C,, + [Pm(Cm + A)
(2)
or
Notice that if there is no insurance, Ch =Cm=1and the equation is (b) Eh =Dh
the usual constant elasticity demand equation. With complete
insurance, Ch =Cm=0 but demand remains finite because A >0
implies a positive nonmonetary cost. EmPmX,
To allow for deductibles and for the maximum net expendi-
ture limit, it is necessary to distinguish four separate cases. Let N =
Eh=Xh Pmam and Em = the expenditures that
would occur at prices Ph, Pm if there were no insurance. Case ivIfEh <
/ Caseiii.
Case iIfEh <Dh and Em <Dm,then Eh =Ehand Em =Em.Here the
insurance is irrelevant because the deductibles exceed the expendi- These foi
ture that would be made in the absence of insurance. The total net distributior
out-of-pocket expenditure is N =Ek+Em. teristics, a
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Case ivIf Eh <Dh and Em >Dm, the results bear an obvious analogy to
Case iii.
These four sets of demand equations can be used to generate the
distribution Fl corresponding to anygross prices, insurance charac-
teristics, and demand parameters. More specifically, given a
baseline distribution F°(Xh,Xm) we can draw values (Xh,Xm) with
the appropriate probability and calculate the corresponding Eh, Em.
Average gross and net expenditures Em, and N) are then readily
computed. This procedure is done separately for each family type.
These calculations and the aggregates produced by combining the
averages for different family types could be used to assess the
effectsof alternative national health insurance proposals if supplies
were infinitely elastic at fixed values of Ph and Pm. This was
essentially the procedure used in Feldstein, Friedman, and Luft
(1972) with a simpler model that did not distinguish hospital and
medical services. The more general use of the demand simulation
model when prices are endogenous is discussed in the next section.
The remainder of this section describes our data sources, the
derivation of the family baseline distributions, and the calibration
of the model to 1970 aggregate experience.
The primary data are the individual insurance claims for more
than 300,000 federal government employees and their dependents
in 1970. All of these persons had the very comprehensive Aetha
"High Option" coverage. A tabulation of the joint frequency dis-
tribution of hospital and medical services (a 24-by-24 matrix of
relative frequencies with an associated matrix of cell means) was
509 Some Effects of National Insurance on Medical Care
or
rid the equation is
With complete







Lnce. The total net
+xjderived for all male employees. Similar tabulations were derived 2. A SUppL
separatelyfor female employees, dependent spouses, and children. li_IE EQU
TheAetna coverage uses a $50 deductible per individual (except
that the first $1,000 of hospital room and board is fully reimbursed) In the
and a coinsurance rate of 20 per cent for both hospital and medical demand pi,
services. For each category of individual, the observed bivariate to a chang
frequency distribution was used to infer the baseline distribution and novelt
corresponding to each of several alternative sets of demand demand
parameters (a's, /3's, and X). This procedure uses the inverse of the microsimul
demand function with Dh= 0,D,,= 50, = Cm = 0.20,and The bas
MAX =Theprices were both normalized to be 1. response x
Family baseline distributions for sixteen different family corn- distinction
positions (e.g., husband and wife; husband, wife, and three chil- the more
dren; etc.) were produced by convoluting the baseline distributions aggregate c
for individuals.2 Persons over 65 were assumed to be excluded from P the price
the basic national health insuranceplan and were therefore ignored no natural
in calculating family distributions. For each of the sixteen family prevailing
compositions, twelve income categories were defined in order to the value 1
implement national health insurance specifications that are income health insu
related and to assess the tax burdens that balance the new govern- An aggre
ment expenditures. - bewritten:
The demand simulation model provides average gross and net (3) In Q =In(
expendituresfor each of the 192 family types. These are also If an
aggregatedto national averages and subaverages by using popula- of the gros
tion counts computed from the Current Population Survey of 1971. insurance
Although the experience of the federal employees with Aetna changes in
High Option coverage is an extremely rich and valuable source of However, s
data, these employees are not a representative sample of all U.S. very
families, particularly in regard to geographic distribution, employ- cannot be g
ment status, and occupation. For each set of demand parameter ing the deff
assumptions (an, am,13n,13m, X) the following additional steps on the der
taken to calibrate the baseline distributions to known national found by
aggregates for 1970. The typical family insurance coverage in 1970 with demai
was assumed to be Dp,= 100,Dm= 100,Ch= 0.25,Cm= 0.40,and The proc MAX =This typical coverage is used for a preliminary simula- iterative si
tion to estimate the national aggregate expenditures corresponding diagram. Fi
to each set of demand parameters. Suppose that the estimated rium that re
expenditures for some set of demand parameters are E and £ and More speci:
that the actual expenditures are Eh°and Theratios EZ/Eh°and rium at po
are then used to deflate the expenditure units of the cone- demanded
sponding baseline distributions. With this calibration completed, insurance r
theimplications of various national health insurance plans may be known but
compared for the given set of demand parameters. simulation
510
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demand provides a market clearing reaction of quantities and prices
to a change in insurance coverage. The computational problems
and novelty of the model occur because there are no aggregate
demand equations but only individual demand equations and a
microsimulation model.
The basic idea and computational procedure for the supply
response model can be described most easily by ignoring the
distinction between hospital and medical services. The solution for
the more general case will be discussed below. Let Qbethe
aggregate quantity of health services consumed by all households,
P the price level, and E the expenditure (E = Q. P).Since there are
no natural units in which to measure Q,wetake the current price
prevailing in the absence of national health insurance (P0) to have
the value 1 and thus define the quantity in the absence of national
health insurance (Q0) to be equal to the expenditure (E0).
An aggregate supply function with constant price elasticity can
be written:
(3)InQ=lnQo+ylnP
If an aggregate market demand function could be written in terms
of the gross market price and the features of the national health
insurance program, the two equations could be solved for the
changes in P and Qthatwould accompany alternative NHI plans.
However, such an aggregate demand function is the outcome of a
very complex and stochastic set of individual demand functions that
cannot be given an aggregate parametric summary. Only by operat-
ing the demand simulation model described in Section 1 can points
on the demand curve be calculated. The market equilibrium is
found by combining the aggregate supply function of Equation (3)
with demand generated by the simulation model.
The process of convergence to an equilibrium solution of this
iterative simulation process is best described with the aid of a
diagram. Figure 1 shows the change in the price-quality equilib-
rium that results from the introduction of national health insurance.
More specifically, in the absence of NHI the market is in equilib-
rium at point A. The demand curve (D1) relates the quantity
demanded to the gross price for the structure of private health
insurance prevailing before NHI. The Dl curve is not actually
known but points on it can be found by using the demand
simulation model. The supply function S corresponds to Equation
511 Some EffectsofNational Insurance on Medical Care
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(3).The introduction of NH! shifts the demand function to D2 and
the equilibrium to B. The computational problem is to determine
the coordinates of the point B even though the two demand curves
are not directly observable.
The following feasible and efficient procedure is used. First, the
demand simulation model is used to find the aggregate quantity
that would be purchased under NH! if price were unchanged—i.e.,
it locates the point C and the quantity Q1.Second,the supply
function is used to solve for the price P1 at which the quantity Q1
wouldbe supplied. Third, the demand simulation model is used
again to find the aggregate quantity demanded in the presence of
NH! but with the gross market pricethis is Q2atpoint E. It is
clear from Figure 1 that (if the aggregate demand function is well
behaved) the equilibrium price after NH! (P*) lies between P0 and
P1. Similarly, the new equilibrium quantity (Q*)liesbetween Q1
andQ2.Thefourth step in the analysis is to approximate the
unknown demand curve (D2) in the relevant range by the straight
512











P3.line connecting points C and E. This is shown as a broken line in
the figure. For computational purposes it is defined by the equa-
tion
(4) Q=Q2—
Equations (3) and (4) may now be combined and solved for
equilibrium price quantity point. This corresponds to point F and
thus to P2 and
Thenext step checks on the closeness of the approximations ofF
to the true new equilibrium B. Since, by construction, F is on the
supply function, the test of closeness depends on the gap between
the trial solution (point F) and the demand curve. To assess this, the
demand simulation model is again used. Simulating with gross
price P2 yields the point G. If the quantities at G and F are
sufficiently close, the analysis is complete. If they differ by more
than some prespecified amount, the iterative procedure can be
continued in order to achieve greater accuracy.
The method of increasing accuracy is illustrated in Figure 2, with
Q
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notation carried over from Figure 1. If Q3isgreater than Q4,the (QH3 and Q,
curveD2 is convex toward the origin in the relevant range; this is three quant
the case that will now be described. If the inequality is reversed, and (QH3, Q
thecurve is concave and the calculations are modified accordingly. the two line
Since the equation for the supply curve is given, it is possible to the presenc
solve for the price P3 at which the quantity Q4wouldbe supplied, demand
Demand simulation then identifies the point H and the quantity
(6) QH —+ thatwould be demanded at price P3. The points G and H are
a1
analogous to the old points E and C. The equation of the line joining and
C and H is found and used as a local approximation to the demand QM =b+
curve.The intersection of this approximation and the supply curve I
identifiesthe pointJ, which is much closer to B than F was. This is The three p
verified and the accuracy evaluated by a further simulation at the stituting the
price corresponding toJ. quantity poi
This iterative simulation method of finding the post-NH! market equations (6
equilibrium is easily extended to separate markets for hospital care rium values
and medical services. The procedure begins by using the demand Figure 1. Ti
simulation model described in Section 1 to calculate the hospital functions. 1
and medical expenditures, Eh and Em,thatwould prevail with NH! demand, the
if the prices remained unchanged.4 Since the pre-NHI prices are PM3. This yi
normalized at 1, these expenditures are also equivalent to quanti- not sufficiez
ties. This yields quantities that may be denoted QH1 and QM1, cor- scribed
responding to point C of Figure 1.
The two aggregate constant elasticity supply functions are:
(5) in QH=In QH0.+ PH
ln QM
3.AN ANAL' whereQH0 and QM0 are the aggregate quantities before NHI, PH
and PM are prices of hospital and medical care (PH0 =PM0=1),and This section
YH and YMaresupply elasticities. Substituting the values QH1 and sociated wil
QM1 into QH and QM yields the prices PH1 and PM1 at which these phasizes the
quantities would be supplied; these prices correspond to point D of of supply as
Figure 1. The demand simulation model is then repeated using PH1 The first I"
and and the deductibles, coinsurance rates, and values of MAX hospitalcare
provided for by the NH! plan. The aggregate quantities demanded rates of 10 p
at these prices, QH2 and QM2, correspond to point E of Figure 2. however, to
Although the coordinates of two points like C and E were These chara
sufficient to define a linear demand equation when hospital and levels and al
medical services were not distinguished, a third point is now plan (NHI-2)
needed if the cross-price effects are to be taken into account. A new 20 per cent
price corresponding to the average of PH1 and the pre-NHI price expenditure
(PH0 =1)is selected for hospital care. A similar value is selected for substantial r
medical care. At these prices (PH2 and PM2), a new set of quantities income famil
514 Feldstein and Friedman 515
ISome(QH3 and QM3) is obtained by simulation. The coordinates of the
three quantity-price points (QHI, QM1, 1, 1), (QH2, QM2, PH1, PM1),
and (QH3, QM3, PH2, PM2) can be used to evaluate the parameters of
the two linear equations that approximate the demand function in
the presence of NHI. More specifically, we take the aggregate
demand equations to be:
(6) QH =a, +a2PH +a3PM
QM=b,+b2PH+b3PM
The three parameters of each equation can be obtained by sub-
stituting the values of the variables for each of the three price
quantity points. The two supply equations (5) and the two demand
equations (6) are then solved simultaneously to obtain trial equilib-
rium values (QH4, QM4, PH3, PM3) that correspond to point F of
Figure 1. This set of values corresponds to a point on the supply
functions. To check the accuracy of the approximation to the
demand, the demand simulation is recomputed for prices PH3 and
PM3. This yields a point that is analogous to G of Figure 1. If this is
not sufficiently accurate, a further iteration is computed as de-
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3. AN ANALYSIS OF TWONI-IlPLANS
Thissection calculates the equilibrium quantities and prices as-
sociated with two alternative NHI options. The analysis em-
phasizes the substantial sensitivity of the results to the elasticities
of supply as well as to the demand parameters.
The first NH! plan (NHI-1) has tow annual deductibles of $50 for
hospital care and $50 for medical services and very low coinsurance
rates of 10 per cent for both types of services. There is no limit,
however, to the family's maximum net expenditure (MAX =cc).
Thesecharacteristics of the NH! plan are the same for all income
levels and all family demographic compositions. The second NHI
plan (NH 1-2) has the same $50 deductibles but a coinsurance rate of
20 per cent for both types of expenditure. Each family's net
expenditure is limited to 10 per cent of family income. This is a
substantial reduction in risk, especially for lower- and middle-
income families.
515
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t
T
Theindividual demand equations are simplified by assuming no
+
cross-priceelasticities (i.e., am==0 in the demand equations of
Section 1). Although hospital services and other services are substi-
tutes for some purposes, they are also complements in other
contexts. The assumption of zero cross-elasticity may therefore be a .0
reasonable starting point for a preliminary analysis.5 Two different
sets of price elasticities have been used. The "moderate" price
elasticities assume that the own-price of hospital care (cih)is0.5 and
the own-price elasticity of medical care (f3m)is0.4. The "low"
elasticity pair assumes that=0.25and fim= 0.20.The relative
nonmonetary cost parameter, X, is assumed to be 0.10 in all the
calculations. The same baseline distributions are used in all income
classes; this implicitly assumes that there is zero income elasticity
of demand.
Table 1 analyzes the first NHI plan. Column 1 presents baseline
figures for 1970 with no NHI program. Total expenditure on
covered services for the population under age 65 is $23.3 billion.
This corresponds to hospital services of $12.9 billion and other
medical care expenditure of $10.4 billion.6 Because the pre-NHI
prices are normalized to be unity, these expenditures can also serve
as measures of quantities for comparison with the post-NHI quan- 9
tities.
Column 2 shows the impact that NHI-1 would have if prices
remained unchanged. Total national expenditures on the covered o
health services would increase 38 per cent to $32.2iion.
The quantity of hospital services rises 38 per cent to 17.8, and the
quantity of other medical services rises 38 per cent to 14.4. The
effective coinsurance rates are 17 per cent for hospital care and
25 per cent for other medical care. The cost to the government is
therefore $25.6 billion.
An analysis with supply elasticities of 0.8 for both hospital care
and other services is presented in column 3. The results are
substantially different from the "pure demand case" of column 2.
Prices rise by approximately 30 per cent. Total expenditure of $37
billion is 15 per cent higher than the estimate that ignored the z
endogenousprice increase. The higher gross prices also imply a
smaller increase in the quantities of care. The quantity of hospital
services is 15.7, indicating that the rise from the pre-NHI value of
12.9 is only 22 per cent, or about half of the estimated increase
when the price response was ignored. The comparison is similar LU
for medical services. It is interesting that national spending in-
creases $13.7 billion, but the extra volume of services is worth only
$5.3 billion at the pre-NHI prices. Column 4 shows comparable j
4
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results for lower suppiy elasticities of YH== 0.2.The total
spending increases are greater but the quantity increases are
smaller.
Columns 6, 7, and 8 present the same comparison of supply
elasticities but with a lower pair of demand elasticities.7 Although
the effects of the NHI plan are now smaller, the implications of
different supply elasticities are still very important. It is clear,
moreover, that plausible differences in supply elasticities are at
least as important as a source of uncertainty in total expenditure and
in the cost to the government as the plausible differences in demand
elasticities.
Table 2 presents a corresponding analysis for the second national
health insurance option. The higher coinsurancerates
(C11 = 0.2)decrease total expenditure but the maximum out-
of-pocket expenditure of 10 per cent of income increases total
expenditure. If prices remained constant, the net effect of these two
changes in the NHI program would be a small reduction in total
cost; with the moderate demand elasticities, total expenditure is
$31.9 billion under plan NHI-2 in contrast to $32.2 billion under
plan NH!-!. The effect of less elastic supply is to increase prices
under both plans. The higher price substantially increases the
probability that each family's expenditure will exceed 10 per cent
of income. At this point, the MAXlimitbecomes effective and the
coinsurance rate ends. Although demand is limited by the non-
monetary price [X/(1 +A.)],there is a substantial increase in demand.
The result is that NHI-2 becomes more expensive than NHI-1. The
government's cost is generally lower under the second plan be-
cause the higher coinsurance rate on relatively small expenditures
more than outweighs the extra cost of providing complete protec-
tion for expenditures above 10 per cent. Only if the supply
elasticities are very low would prices rise enough to reverse this
situation and make NHI-2 more expensive; this happens here with
YH== 0.2.Notice that with the lower demand elasticities the
rise in expenditure is always sufficiently small so that NH 1-2 entails
lower total expenditure and lower cost to the government. Z
Thesupply elasticity can also affect the distributional impact of a
national health insurance plan. Because the current simulations
assume a zero income elasticity of demand for health services, the
first NH! plan provides the same expected benefits at all income
levels to families with any fixed demographic composition. NHI-2,
LU
on the other hand, limits each family's net expenditure to no more
than 10 per cent of family income. For low-income families, this is a w
substantialreduction in the net price of health services, whereas for
4
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4higher-income families the effect on price is much smaller. The
result is a more substantial increase in spending at lower incomes.
These distributional effects are presented in Table 3. The
analysis refers to the second NHI plan and to the moderate price a
elasticities.Columns 1 through 3 describe the impact on families of 8
twoadults and two children in the case in which prices are ii4..
unchanged—i.e.,infinitely elastic supplies of hospital and medical
services at the original prices. Column 1 presents the average net o
benefitreceived by families at each income level—i.e., the average
cost to the government as insurer. These net benefits fall rapidly for
the first few income classes and then fall more slowly, reflecting the —
highlyskewed distribution of health spending. Similarly, the aver-
age direct out-of-pocket payments by the family (column 2) increase
rapidly for the first few income classes and then more slowly. The
total quantity of care received is, with prices fixed at unity, the sum
of the net benefits and direct payments; these quantities are shown C
incolumn 3. The quantity of care consumed also falls rather rapidly
§. atfirst and then more slowly.
All three columns show that progression is introduced
by the single feature of a 10 per cent maximum limit on direct
payments,even when there is a relatively low 20 per cent coinsur- E E
ance rate. It is convenient to have a summary measure of the
distributional impact and a method of combining the benefits (or
payments or quantities) in different income classes into a single
measure that reflects a constant value judgement about distribu-
tional equity. The "uniformly distributed dollar" (UDD) measure is Q. Z
usefulfor this purpose. For example, the UDD value of benefits is a
weighted sum of the average benefits per family in each income Z
class:
Bisthe benefit per family in income class i,is the weight
given to a marginal dollar of a family in income class i, and N1 is the E
number of families in class i. Notice that if B1 =1,BUDD1;thus C'
oneunit in the BUDDmeasureis the social value of $1.00 given to
each family—i.e., the social value of a uniformly distributed dollar. —
Itis convenient to relate the W1's to income by a simple functional
relation. The constant elasticity function W1 = is both familiar
andconvenient. For a1 it implies that the weight given to a 0
marginal dollar of income varies inversely with the income of the
recipient family. The higher the value of a, the more egalitarian the
implied preferences. j E
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Table 3 shows the BUDDvaluescorresponding to values of a 4. A PRICE
betweenzero and 2. The value of a =0 corresponds to the simple Neither h
average of benefits with no weighting for distribution. The average agents to
benefit (cost to the government) per family with two adults and two mination a
children is thus $497. For someone whose distributional prefer- tals, the sp
ences correspond to a =1,these benefits are, equivalent to $562 sional intr
distributed uniformly to all such families. With more egalitarian the traditi
preferences (a =2),the benefits are equivalent to $696 distributed useful to
uniformly. Conversely, the average value of direct out-of-pocket special
payments is $169 per family of two adults and two children, but this model" pi
amount is equivalent to a smaller uniformly distributed payment of markets fo
$156 for a =1and $122 for a =2.Finally, the average quantity of ously dev
services is $667 per family. Applying the same UDD evaluation to important
these benefits implies that for a =1,they are equivalent to a quantity e
constant $718 per family, and nonpr
The effect of introducing supply elasticities of 0.8 for hospital and Conside
medical, services is to increase prices and therefore expenditures at response
all income levels. The equilibrium quantities are now smaller than price of p
before. Benefits rise by about 18 per cent in the lower-income increased
classes and about 14 per cent in the higher-income classes. Direct plete insu
costs rise by about 7 per cent in the lower-income classes and about increases
11 per cent in the higher-income classes. Thus in both of these the financ
ways the NHI-2 plan is slightly more redistributive when the physicians
supply response is explicitly recognized. But the relatively greater the opporl
direct payments by higher-income families just about offset the they like b
relatively lower benefits from the insurer and make the propor- raised wit]
tional change in the quantity of services approximately equal at all More sp
income levels; the quantities shown in column 6 are almost exactly post-NHI
90 per cent of the quantities in column 3.
' PM Although the NHI-2 plan is very progressive with respect to (8) =
incomewhen attention is focused on families with a single demo-
graphic composition, this characteristic is disguised when all family where NP
types are combined. Average family size increases with family in- prevailing
come; there are fewer single-person families and larger average coinsuran
numbers of children. Columns 7 through 9 show that this has strik- that wOUl(
ing effects on the distribution of average benefits, direct payments, price.9 T
and quantities of care. Average benefits rise with income until straightfor
$15,000 and then fall only slightly. Average direct payments rise NPMO as
much more sharply with income. The net effect is that quantity physicians
increases with family income up to $25,000, despite the income- vices. The
related' limit on direct payments. It is clear from this comparison the calculc
that it is important to take demographic structure into account in the gross i
evaluating the distributional impact of alternative NHI plans. Equation
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Neitherhospitals nor physicians are like the typical economic
agents to which the traditional theory of price and quantity deter-
mination applies. These differences—the nonprofit nature of hospi-
tals, the special expertise of physicians, and the physicians' profes-
sional interest—may not be enough to vitiate the applicability of
the traditional theory in sections 2 and 3. Nevertheless, it seems
useful to provide an alternative response model that contains
special features of the health care sector. The "price response
model" presented in this section incorporates ideas about the
markets for physicians' services and hospital care that were previ-
ously developed by Feldstein (1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1974). An
important characteristic of this alternative model is that the price-
quantity equilibrium need not be market clearing; excess demand
and nonprice rationing may prevail in equilibrium.
Consider first the model of physicians' behavior. The price
response model specifies that the effect of NHI is to raise the gross
price of physicians' services by an amount that depends on the
increased insurance coverage of physicians' services. More com-
plete insurance raises the physicians' price not only because it
increases demand, but also becausG physicians take into account
the financial impact of their fees on their patients. Moreover,
physicians may seek to maintain excess demand in order to have
the opportunity to select the types of patients and diagnoses that
they like to treat; an increase in insurance permits gross prices to be
raised without reducing the desired degree of excess demand.8
More specifically, the change from the pre-NHI price, PM0, to the
post-NH! price, PM1, is given by the function:
(8) !ML=
PM0LNPM0J
where NPM0 is the average net price of physicians' services
prevailing before NH! (i.e., the product of PM0 and the effective
coinsurance rate before NHI) and NPM1 is the average net price
that would prevail after NHI if physicians did not alter their gross
price.9 The computational procedure for deriving PM1 is
straighiforward. The demand simulation model is used to calculate
NPM0 as the ratio of aggregate direct patient expenditure on
physicians' services to aggregate total expenditure on those ser-
vices. The insurance coverage is then changed to the NH! plan and
the calculation is repeated to obtain NPMI. Since NPMI depends on
the gross price PM0, no iterative procedure is necessary. Applying
Equation (8) then yields the new price that prevails under NH!.
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analyze this
If the aggregate demand at price PM1 (and corresponding hospital demand-del
price PHI) is less than or equal to the desired supply QM1, the hospital sei
equilibrium quantity is "demand-determined"; i.e., each family
gets the quantity of physicians' services that it wants at the new (11)
PH1=
prevailingprice.If, however, asis probably more likely, the 1?
aggregatedemand exceeds supply, the new equilibrium is "supply-
determined." Each family obtains only some fraction of the services where
that it would like to purchase with the new prices and insurance before NH
coverage. In the absence of better information about nonprice after NHI i
rationing, the current model specifies that each family receives the Feldstein
same fraction of the quantity that it demands regardless of income, with the a
demographic composition, or desired expenditure. More specifi- model is ti





where QMD is the aggregate quantity of physicians' services
demanded at prices PM1 and PH1 under the NHI plan, and QM1 is In QH, =
thedesired aggregate supply defined in Equation (9). Each indi-
vidual family then obtains RM times the quantity that it demands wnere YR
according to the basic demand equations in Section 1, with ter (RH) is
Ph =PH1and Pm =PM1. individual
Notice that the use of nonprice rationing increases the likelihood mine the a
that some families would receive less care than in the absence of The pri
NHI even if NHI improves everyone's coverage. This will clearly strained b
happen when the supply elasticity is zero but the demand elasticity price contr
is non-zero. NHI then increases demand and results in a rationing PH1 are
parameter RM less than 1. Unless all families' demands are in- equations (
creasedin exactly the same proportion, the NHI would reduce the lated with
quantity of care received by some families. tions yield
Although the hospital services section of the price response allocation (
modelhas the same formal structure as the model of physicians' prices, and
services, the interpretation of this behavior is quite different. An The two
analysis of hospitals' response to the growth of private insurance in been rean
the 1960s and to the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid
suggests that hospitals respond to insurance by increasing the cost assigned t
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per patient day through more sophisticated care and higher staff
wages. Prices rise in response to additional insurance not because
of a greater unit cost of providing more of the same type of care (i.e.,
a rising supply curve in the traditional sense) but because hospitals
produce a different product and choose to pay higher wages. To
analyze this as. a response to NH!, the price response model with a
demand-determined equilibrium would be used. The price of
hospital services after the introduction of NH! is given by
(11)
PH0
whereNPHO is the average net price of hospital services prevailing
before NH! and NPH1 is the average net price that would prevail
after NH! if hospitals did not alter their gross price. The analysis in
Feldstein (1971a) suggests this type of behavior with 0 1. and
with the actual quantity determined by household demand. The
model is thus completed by using PH, and PM, to calculate each
family's demand and assuming that hospitals will supply this
quantity.
Alternatively, the price response model may be evaluated with a
supply-determined equilibrium by the hospital supply equa-
tion
in QH, =ln QH0 +y8lnPH,
wriere YH is the elasticity of supply. The hospital rationing parame-
ter (RH) is then defined by an equation analogous to (10). The
individual demand equations and RH are then combined to deter-
mine the allocation of the rationed hospital care.
The price response model in which the quantities are con-
strained by supply can also be used to examine the case in which
price controls are used to limit the price rise. The prices PM1 and
PH1 are then determined by the price control agency instead of by
equations (8) and (11). The corresponding supplies are then calcu-
lated with equations (9) and (12). The individual demand simula-
tions yield rationing parameters RM and RH and the rationed
allocation of services corresponding to the NHI plan, the controlled
prices, and the quantities supplied.
The two alternative NHI options discussed in Section 3 have
been reanalyzed with the current price response model. More
specifically, the price response parameters 6Hand areboth
assigned the value 0.5; a 20 per cent decrease in the effective
525 SomeEffects of NationalInsurance on Medical Carecoinsurance rate (e.g., from 0.40 to 0.32) thus raises the gross prices
by approximately 10 per cent and therefore also lowers the net
price by about 10 per cent. For medical services, the total supply is
assumed fixed—i.e., YM=0.The equilibrium quantities of medical
services are therefore supply-determined. For hospital services, a
positive supply elasticity (YR =0.5)is assumed. The same two
alternative demand specifications as in Section 3 are again investi-
gated. With the "moderate" demand elasticities (a,, =0.5,(3m =0.4),
the increase in demand exceeds the increase in supply and the
allocation of hospital services is also supply-determined. Only with
the "low" demand elasticities(a,, =0.25,/3,,, =0.2)is there no
excess demand and a demand-determined allocation.
The aggregate implications of these price response models are
shown in columns 5 and 9 of tables 1 and 2. With the moderate
demand elasticities, the total cost implications are quite similar to
the previous analysis with supply elasticities of 0.8 and market-
clearing prices. Total national spending under NHI-1 is $38.1
billion, in comparison to the earlier value of $37 billion; for NHI-2,
the figures are $36.5 billion and $37.3 billion. Estimated costs to
the government are also quite similar. The underlying price and
quantity changes are, however, very different; price rises are
greater and quantity increases are smaller. For NHI-1, total national
spending increases by $14.8 billion to buy only $1.4 billion worth
of additional services valued at original prices (i.e., quantity in-
creases from 23.3 billion to 24.7 billion). With NHI-2, the extra
spending of $13.2 billion induces only an extra quantity worth $2.5
billion at original prices.
Although the prices and aggregate quantities are quite different
_____________
underthe two models, for the two sets of assumptions examined
here the distributional implications are approximately the same.
Table 4 shows the distributions of benefits, direct out-of-pocket
payments, and quantities for families with two adults and two
children under the price response model and under the supply
response model with== 0.8.Although benefits and direct
payments are lower under the price response model, the ratios of
corresponding values under the two models is approximately con-
stant. Similarly, quantities are some 10 per cent lower at each
income level. It should, of course, be stressed that this result
depends on the particular assumptions made for this comparison.
With a more complex insurance structure (e.g., deductibles related
to income) or different elasticities of demand and supply, the two
different models of provider behavior may imply quite different
distributional patterns.
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TABLE 4 Distributional Aspects of NHI Plan 2: Comparison
of Price Response and Supply Response Models
—PriceResponseModel——Supply Response Model—
YH—O-S YM—O YH=YM—O8
Net Direct Net Direct
Income
BenefitsPaymentsQuantityBenefitsPaymentsQuantity
Class (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
<$ 2,000 $945 $ 89 730' $968 $ 90 814
$ 2,000—812 137 669 830 140' 745
$ 3,000—750 150 634 770 154 709
$ 4,000—723 159 621 735 163 689
$ 5,000—696 166 607 709 170 675
$ 6,000—664 172 589 678 176 656
$ 7,000—638 176 574 651 180 638
$ 8,000—604 181 554 617 185 617
$10,000—572 185 534 586 189 596
$12,000— 543 188 516 551 192 576
$15,000— 506 193 494 520 197 '552
$25,000+ 470 195 470 484 199 527
UDD
Variables
a =0.0 582 182 539 596 186 602
a = 0.5 611 176 556 626 180 620
a = 1.0 657 166 581 672 170 647
a = 1.5 725 149 617 742 153 688




use moderate demand elasticities and refer to families of two adults and
The primary purpose of this paper has been to emphasize that any
analysis of the effects of alternative national health insurance plans
should take. into account the effect of insurance on the prices
supplies of health services. An operational method was presented
for combining a stochastic microsimulational model of household
demand with aggregate supply and price determination equations.
The suppiy models used in this analysis are preliminary and can
only be regarded as illustrative. Neither the traditional supply
527 Some Effects of National Insurance on Medical Caremodel in Section 2 nor the price response model in Section 4 can be
eliminated as completely inconsistent with the data. More
econometric research is therefore required to provide conditional
estimates of the parameters of both models. We hope that the
current evidence of the importance of these parameters will en-




1.For simplicity, the actual calculations assume EmEmin both subcases.
2.Although the independence assumption seems strong, there are several coun-
tervailing forces that may produce such independence. Some preliminary
comparisons of convoluted "synthetic" family distributions and actual family
distributions supported the assumption of independence.
3.This assumption for "typical" coverage is based on Reed (1969) and information
supplied by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
4.Notice that the simulation model in Section 1 permits specifying a separate set of
deductibles, coinsurance rates, and MAX value for each of the 192 family
demographic types and income classes.
5.Davis and Russel (1972) did provide some evidence of positive cross-price
elasticities, but medical services in their study were limited to hospital outpa-
tient care.
6.Actual costs in 1970 were $13.2 billion for hospital services and $10.1 billion for
medical services. The calibration method described above does not yield these
exact figures because of the nonlinearity of the insurance schedules. These
dollar amounts refer to persons under age 65; see Cooper et at. (1973).
7.Columns 5 and 9 present results that wilibe discussed in Section 4.
8.These ideas are developed more fully in Feldstein (1970, 1974).
9.This model of price response is clearly a simplification that is used because no
more specific hypothesis seems either theoretically or empirically superior.
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Within the last few years there has been considerable interest in the adoption
of national health insurance (NHI) in the U.S. Although the three letters NHI
may have wide appeal, as with apple pie, there is substantial disagreement
over which recipe is best. Legislative proposals range from the Long-Ribicoff
mandatory catastrophic insurance to the virtual cradle-to-grave-universal-
zero-out-of-pocket cost coverage of the Health Security Bill.
The various proposals, including the one to "do nothing," have elicited
much discussion. Everyone seems to agree that NHI would increase the
amount of services demanded and the price of a unit of service. Concern for
the increased share of GNP devoted to the medical sector and the change in
the distribution of income arising from NHI has led to a variety of collateral
proposals to control units purchased and prices charged.
Part of the uncertainty about NHI is attributable to the difficulty economists
The views expressed in these comments, based on the version of the paper presented at the
conference, are solely those of the author.
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529 Some Effects of National Insurance on Medical CareI
have in measuring magnitudes. We are quite good at measuring directions of sumptions.
change, but quite poor in measuring magnitudes. This is not unique to the all the subtl
health field—for example,itis now well established that a 10 per cent A priori,
increase in the minimum wage will decrease the employment of teenagers, necessarily
but by how much is far less certain. However, research on the impact of NHI interesting
has encountered additional handicaps. The data on current utilization are estimates.I
inadequate. Also, the economist's tools are designed for the analysis of model has
marginal changes in a partial equilibrium model, whereas NHI would have , provide prc
such profound widespread effects that a model that allows for a variety of procedures
long-ru,n interactions may be the best approximation. should be i
These points indicate that measuring the impact of NHI is not an easy is a better I
research topic. For some of the same reasons, however, the quantification of A prelimi
the impact isofvitalconcern, We know that NHI willinfluence the current tarç
shareof GNP devotedtothehealthsector. The magnitude ofthe data on the
change and what we get for it in terms of improved health will influence our which of th
view of the wisdom of NHI. A wrong decision with respect to NHI will be very pattern?
costly. And, if an NHI is adopted, the political costs of reversing our policy In their m
may be substantial as new interest groups develop, even if it turns out that for man estima
the country as a whole NHI is economically inefficient.'In a world of .by assumin
uncertainty, the larger the cost of enduring a wrong decision and the greater absence of
the cost of reversing a decision, the greater the amount of resources that coinsuranc
should be devoted to finding the correct decision, and the more we should expenditun
appear to be risk averse.2 models of I
It is for these reasons that the Feldstein-Friedman paper, and the work of They exp
others, on estimating the impact of NHI is of considerable importance. of medical
Feldstein and Friedman correctly recognize that NHI has a direct impact on manner nv
the demand for medical care and that this. chanQe in demand induces a per cent ci
supply response. It is the combined effects of the change in the demand curve demand for
and the movement along the supply curve for medical care that generate the . (arbitrarily)
change in the quantity and price of the units of medical care provided. is 0.09 v
Feldstein and Friedman use a microsimulation model of household demand household
and an aggregate model of supply to predict the price and quantity of medical Unfortun
care services that would arise from alternative models of NHI. They prefer a medical ca
microsimulation model because an "aggregate specification of demand insurance
behavior cannot capture the subtle differences in the .response of demand to there has p
different types of insurance policies.' There is truth in this statement. medical ca
An aggregate specification, however, may be better able to account for the money cost
effects,ifany, of interactionsin demand among individuals.3 Although the expansi
interacting individual demand may not be important for marginal changes, it be useful if
may be important for a large nationwide change in the medical care system interesting
brought about by NHI. Also, the microsimulation model as formulated by nonmoney
Feldstein and Friedman—and any microsimulation model—embodies a van- From ec
ety of built-in behavioral assumptions. The authors assume, for example, that elastic in th
each family has the same price elasticity of demand, the income elasticity of supply
demand for medical care is zero, the cross-price elasticity of demand for NHI modeh
hospital and out-of-hospital care is zero, individual demand curves are and
independent of one another, etc. These are probably reasonably good as- long run we
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emarid curves are
asonably good as-
sumptions. Unfortunately, by making these assumptions they cannot capture
all the subtle differences in demand.,
A priori,itisnot clear that an aggregate model of demand would
necessarilybe a predictor than a microsimulation model. It would be
interesting to know the extent to which the two procedures yield different
estimates.If they generate essentially the same estimates, the aggregate
model has the advantage of simplicity but the microsimulation model would
provide predicted use rates for specific demographic groups.If the two
procedures generate widely different estimates, the cause of the difference
should be investigated. Unfortunately, we may not be able to determine which
is a better predictor until after we have had some experience with NHI.
A preliminary answer could perhaps come from an analysis of our two
current targeted NHI programs—Medicare and Medicaid. Using pre-1966
data on the utilization of health services by the aged, the poor, and all others,
which of the two procedures more accurately predicts the current utilization
pattern?
In their microsimulation model of household demand, Feldstein and Fried-
man estimate expenditures for hospital and out-of-hospital medical services
by assuming a constant (gross price) elasticity of demand equation in the
absence of insurance. By introducing modifications for deductibles and
coinsurance, including zero per cent coinsurance beyond some level of
expenditure, they are able to estimate the effect on demand of alternative
models of NHI.
They explicitly include the parameter X,'which measures the nonmoney cost
of medical care. The units for A are not spelled out and I am troubled by the
manner in which it is included. In equations (1) and (2), for example, for a zero
per cent coinsurance, the market price, Ph, should have no effect on the
demand for hospital care, yet the price variable is APh/(1 + A). Since A is
(arbitrarily) assumed to be 0.1 in the computations, the price to the household
is 0.09 Ph, which is a function ofIt is not clear why the nonmoney cost to the
household would be proportional to the market price.4
Unfortunately, we know very little about the role of nonmarket costs in the
medical care field, and in others. With the growth of private and public
insurance for out-of-pocket expenditures and the rise in the value of time,
there has presumably been a substitution toward goods-intensive forms of
medical care that economize on time. This suggests that the relative non-
money cost parameter A may not be constant but may decline in response to
the expansion of insurance coverage for out-of-pocket expenditures. It would
be useful it the microsimulation model allowed for this effect. It would also be
interesting to see the effect of alternative specifications of the magnitude of
nonmoney costs.
From economic theory we know that demand and supply curves are less
elastic in the short run than in the long run. Using the very low demand and
supply elasticities (ah = 0.25, f3rn=0.20, )' = 0.2), the simulation of the two
NHI models predicts a modest 7 per cent increase in the quantity of hospital
and medical care. However, prices increase by at least 40 per cent. For the
long run we can expect a very large supply elasticity. Using an infinite supply
531 Some Effects of National Insurance on Medical Careelasticity and the Feldstein-Friedman moderate" demand elasticities (a,, =
0.5, 13m=0.4), the quantity of care provided increases by approximately 37
per cent in their simulation.
The long-run estimate of the increase in is likely to be biased
downward. With the subsidization of direct costs but not of time costs, we
would expect a substitution of goods for time, and hence a decline in the
parameter A. By holding A constant, Feldstein and Friedman ignore what
may be an increasingly important source of increased demand for medical
services.
Feldstein and Friedman present simulations of the distributional impact
among income groups. They assume a zero income elasticity of demand, the
same price elasticity of demand for all income groups, that A equals 0.1 for all
income groups,etc.Although these simplifying assumptions may be
adequate it we are interested only in an aggregate simulation, they are clearly
highly suspect if we focus on different income classes.
For example, the nonmonetary cost of a day of hospitalization is likely to be
substantially higher for a professional than for a skilled craft worker, and the
latter's time cost is likely to be higher than that of a domestic day worker.
Hence, if A falls with lower-income levels, NHI results in a larger relative
decline in price for lower-income than for higher-income groups. Then, by
assuming a constant A, Feldstein and Friedman underestimate the increase in
the utilization of services by low-income groups relative to higher-income
groups. Thus, ceteris paribus, NHI would be more progressive in redistribut-
ing medical service to lower-income groups than would be indicaled by
Feldstein and Friedman's Table 3.
Feldstein and Friedman have made an important contribution in this paper


























1.The oil depletion allowance was but one example of an apparently politically irreversible policy.
2.K. Arrow and A.C.Fisher,Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Irreversibility,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1974), pp. 312—320.
3.These interactions may be attributable to local styles of medicine, including bandwagon effects,
and to the level and spread of information.
4.A positive nonmoriey price, however, does play an important role, as indicated by the finite
demand with "free" (zero per cent coinsurance) medical care. For the aged and the poor, an
important component of the nonmoney price of medical care—the value of time—is very low.
Does this explain the very large response to the introduction of Medicaid and Medicare?elasticities =
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ikely to be biased
of time costs, we




':ity of demand, the
AequalsO.1 for all
mptions may be
)fl, they are clearly
ation is likely to be
aft worker, and the
testic day worker.
n a larger relative
groups. Then, by









indicated by the finite
aged and the poor, an
of time—is very low.
tid and Medicare?
Michael D. Intriligator
University of California, Los Angeles and
Human Resources Research Center,
University of Southern California
In their paper, Feldstein and Friedman (FF hereafter) use a microsimulation
model of the health care system in order to study the effects of alternative
national health insurance (NHI) proposals. These comments are organized
into three sections. The first discusses the use of a microeconometric model
as a tool for policy evaluation. The second summarizes the FF ml-
croeconometric model and compares it to the Human Resources Research
Center (HRRC) microeconometric model of the health care system.' The third
discusses the major conclusions of the FF and HRRC models with regard to
NHI.
1. THE USE OF A MICROECONOMETRIC MODEL
FOR POLICY EVALUATION
Figure1summarizes the procedure by which a microeconometric model
could be used for policy evaluation in a wide variety of areas, including not
only health but also education, transportation, housing, economic stabiliza-
tion, and many others. It also specifies how it could be used in the particular
application area treated by FF.
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FIGURE 1Use of a Microeconometric Model for
Policy EvaluationThe procedure begins with a government agency responsible for policy in a 2. COMPAI
particular area. For FF the agency is the Office of the Secretary of the AND HR
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Responsible individuals
in the agency identify a particular issue that is both of concern and subject to The FF an
influence by the agency. For FF the issue is the cost and distribution of health health Ca
care. comparis
The agency individuals and/or model builders specify alternative policies sented in
that could affect the issue to be treated. In this instance, among the alternative
policies are the various payment features of a NHI plan, specifically the levels TABLE 1
of deductibles, coinsurance rates, and maximum net out-of-pocket expendi-
ture for individuals or families.2
The alternative policies are analyzed and evaluated by use of a formal
framework, which can take the form, as in FF, of a microeconometric model,
involving interacting microsimulation and econometric models. The mi-
crosimulation portion of the structure facilitates both treatment of detailed
features, such as changes in eligibility or differences in costs or benefits to Population
different individuals, and treatment of distributional effect. The aggregate
econometric portion of the structure facilitates treatment of macro interactions
on markets, such as price/qtiantity determination in product markets and
wage/employment determination in factor markets. FE use this interactive
framework in relating demand, obtained from an aggregation of estimated
demands via the microsimulation model, to supply, obtained from aggregate
relationships, in order to determine prices.
The methodology used to evaluate the alternative policies is simulation.
Each set of policies implies an alternative future course of relevant variables
determined as a forecast of the estimated model, conditional on the particular
set of policies. For EF the alternative payment features imply alternative
values of total expenditure, cost to government, and quantity and price of Demand
medical and hospital care, as reported in their tables 1 and 2.
The simulations are then reported to the initiating agency, in this case the
Office of the Secretary of HEW. If necessary, the entire process can be iterated Supply
by selecting related issues or other policies to derive new simulations.
Eventually, the policy-makers select a particular simulation they desire and
adopt the relevant set of policies implying this simulation. Of course, actually
carrying out the adopted set of policies entails a complex process of
legislative enactment, organizational development, budgetary appropria-
tions, etc. Price
This procedure is quite general;it can be applied to a wide variety of Response
policy-making situations. The future of policy evaluation could very well be
based on this procedure, with close relationships being formed between
policy-makers and model-builders. In effect, through the rnicroeconometric
model, the model-builders will be providing the policy-makers with a 'wind
tunnel" in which alternative policy configurations can be tested before actual Data Base
use. Much of existing policy has been based on only the sketchiest idea about
its immediate and primary effects and virtually no information concerning its
delayed and secondary effects. The procedure outlined in Figure 1 could
provide government agencies with needed guidance on important policy
issues.
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Population Families: 192 types
16 family compositions
12 income categories
Constant elasticity: D =
Do: base quantity; p = net price;
€: elasticity, assumed at 'mod-
erate" or "low" levels
Constant elasticity: S =
S0: base quantity
'y elasticity, assumed at alternative
levels:0.8 or 0.2
Price Either market clearing:
Response
or price response model:
-
- \ Npt)
where N0 = net price
Data Base Over 300,000 federal government
employees and dependents







2 place of medical school training,
domestic or foreign
Constant elasticity: D =
Do: base quantity; p = net price;
€: elasticity, estimated for physi-
cians and length of hospital stay
Quantity supplied determined
from
1. Numbers of physicians,
nurses, and hospitals
2. Demand for non-physician labor
3. Production functions
Adjustment of prices based on
trend and excess demand:
Pt..1 =coPt + —
Over 130,000 responses from the
Health Interview Survey, con-
ducted by the U.S. National
Center for Health Statistics in
1967,
U
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2. COMPARISON OF THE FF MICROSIMULATION
AND HRRC MICROECONOMETRIC MODELS
The FF and HRRC models are two different microeconometric models of the
health care system, both of which have been used for policy evaluation. A
comparison of some of their more important structural components is pre-
sented in Table 1,
TABLE 1Comparison of the Feldstein-Friedman (FF) Micro-
Simulation Model and the Yett-Drabek-lntrili-










SupplyAn essential feature of a microsimulation modelis a population (or directly
populations) being simulated. In the FF study the population Consists of severe Ii
families of 192 types, determined from family composition and income ages, an
categories. These families determine demand for health services. In the equilibrii
HRRC Microeconometric Model there are three populations being simulated.3 clear the
The firstis a population of individuals demanding health services. This on chan
population is described by age, sex, race, and income characteristics. The demand
second population is one of physicians supplying outpatient services. This consider
population is described by age, specialty, professional activity, and training model,
(domestic- or foreign-trained medical school graduates). The third population demand
includes nurses assisting in the provision of outpatient and inpatient services.
. This population is described by age.
/ t+t =
The demand specification of both models is of the constant elasticity type in Thus, pri
which a demand curve is passed through a particular base quantity-price or decel
point by assuming that the price elasticity of demand is constant. In this demand
instance price is net price—price times the coinsurance rate.4 The base ment equ
quantities are derived from historical data. In FF the elasticities of demand for =
physician and hospital services are assumed at two different levels, "moder- are estim
ate" or "low." In the HRRC study the demand elasticities are estimated tested to
through regression analysis and they differ,for example, for different
specialties for outpatient services. Also, the demand for hospital services federal g
is treated somewhat differently in the HRRC study than in the FF study. Aetna "Hi
Instead of estimating a single demand function for hospital servIces, 130,000 i
separate demand functions are estimated for hospital admission and National
of hospital stay. precise, r
The supply specification is radically different in the two models. In the FF the HRR(
model a supply function analogous to the demand function is postulated and from their
is assumed to exhibit constant elasticity. Alternative assumptions are made who choo
about the value of this elasticity:0.8, or 0.2. In the HRRC model, on the represent
other hand, the quantities supplied of inpatient or outpatient services are more repr
determined from estimated production functions, using factor inputs that
are determined both from input demand functions, dependent on. wages, and
from the simulated population of physicians.5 Thus, supply in the HRRC
model depends on simulated populations—of physicians, nurses and hospi-
tals, factors not treated explicitly in the FF model. Explicit treatment of these
factors, however, facilitates analysis of various policy initiatives, such as CONCLI
added training programs for physicians in medical schools, added nurse MICROS
training programs, and hospital construction, that might be undertaken in
conjunction with NHI.Itmight also be pointed out that such a supply There are
specification must be based on the assumption of perfectly competitive conclude
markets for both inpatient and outpatient services, since itis only in such importanc
markets that supply functions of the type they treat exist. Such an assumption governme
is both extreme and at considerable variance with previous analyses of these the popul
markets, which typically treat the relevant markets as ones of oligopoly, or Their con
monopolistic competition. demand
Because of the nature of their demand/supply specifications, FF do not depend a'
have independent estimates of demand and supply. They therefore cannot demand d
536 Feldstein and FriedmanThus, prices increase according to the trend rate a — 1, with acceleration
or deceleration around the trend rate depending on whether excess
demand is positive or negative, respectively. If a = 1, the price adjust-
ment equation reduces to the usual tatonnement model, whereas if /3 = 0 (or
=the price adjustment equation reduces to a simple trend. Values of a
are estimated from historical time trends. Alternative /3's were considered and
tested for sensitivity.6
Turning to the data, FF utilize data concerning over 300000 families of
federal government employees and their dependents who are enrolled in the
Aetna 'High Option" coverage. The HRRC study utilizes data concerning over
130,000 individuals from the 1967 Healt? Interview Survey, conducted by the
National Center for Health Statistics. Although the FF data may be more
precise, more complete, and available for greater numbers of individuals than
the HRRC data, there is some question about its relevance. FF extrapolate
from their data to national demands, but the behavior of federal employees
who choose a particularly complete package of health insurance may not be
representative of the behavior of the entire population. The HIS sample is a
more representative sample of the entire population.
3. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE TWO
MICROSIMULATION MODELS
There are two major conclusions that FF draw from their model: First, they
conclude that supply, particularly the price elasticity of supply, is of major
importance in calculating effects of NHI on prices, quantities, cost to the
government, etc. Second, they conclude that the demographic composition of
the population is of major importance in evaluating distributional effects.
Their conclusions, in qualitative form, are apparent from a simple supply-
demand diagram wherein the effects of a NHI-induced shiftin demand
depend on the elasticity of the supply schedule and the extent of the shift in
demand depends on the family composition of the population. The quantita-
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f
directly treat disequilibrium phenomena in the relevant markets. This is a
severe limitation given the existence of waiting lists, discussions of short-
ages, and rapid price increases in these markets, all of which suggest dis-
equilibrium. FF postulate either a market-clearing model, wherein prices
clear the markets, or a price response model, wherein price changes depend
on changes in net price. In the HRRC model, on the other hand, wherein
demand and supply are determined on the basis of fundamentally different
considerations, disequilibrium phenomena can be treated directly. In this
model, price in period t + 1is the following function of price and excess
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tions, FF do not
therefore cannot7
tive counterparts of this diagrammatic observation are summarized in the NOTES
tables in the FF paper.
There are five major conclusions of the HRRC study. First, demographic 1.The HRR
information and prices are not nearly so effective in explaining demand for Leonard
health services as demographic information, prices, and health conditions.7
The health status of the population, as well as such NHI features as D.C.: Bur
coinsurance, etc., determine demand for health services.
The second conclusion of the HRRC study is the importance of the Eleme;
distribution of the population for the composition of health services provided. Presente
Thus, a bulge" in the number of women of child-bearing age has a significant
effect on demands for the services of pediatricians and obstetricians, two of System ii
the physician specialties explicitly treatedthe HRRC model. . 5th Cont
The third conclusion of the HRRC study is the importance of the foreign A. Ruber
medical graduates (FMG's), based on a simulation study that exploited the Veiiag,1
capability of the model to track separately physicians trained domestically Mathema
and those trained abroad. The FMG's are important components of the health An ove
care system, especially for hospital staffs, and the number of FMG's is more System I
susceptible to policy choices, especially in the short run, than the numbers of 29,1973,
physicians trained domestically. In fact, the most critical factor influencing HealttpC
the supply of physicians in the short run is the net migration rate of FMG's. A Lexingto
more liberal policy toward FMG's could play a significant roleri meeting the All put
demands created by NHI. There are, however, indications that a less liberal 2.For anoth
policy will be pursued over the next several years. This policy could have
profound effects on the supply of physician services. This papa
The fourth conclusion of the HRRC study is the fundamental importance to only;
NHI outcomes of the productivity of physicians and other labor inputs in
. features,
organizat producing outpatient and Inpatient services. Thus, the HRRC study found, as
3.in addilic
FF did, that supply is of major importance to NHI outcomes, but it treated 4.FF also a
explicitly the determinants of supply—manpower and productivity. 5.Produciic
The fifthmajor conclusion of the HRRC studyisthe importance of tionFunci
organizational factors. Changing the mix of practice settings (e.g., a shift from
solo to group practices) and changing the mix of institutions (e.g., types of
' Employec






Feldstein and Friedman and the Human Resources Research Center have
developed microeconomic models of the health care system that exhibit some
similarities (e.g., in the specification of demand) but differ in both certain
structural components (e.g., population, supply, price adjustment) and in the
nature of their conclusions. Both are pathbreaking studies, however, in the
application of formal analyses to the study of policy issues, specifically the
application of microeconometric models to the study of features of national
health insurance.
538 Feldstein and Friedman 539 Si1.The HRRC microeconometric model of the health care system, developed by Donald E. Yett,
Leonard J. Drabek, Michael D. Intriligator, and Larry J. Kimbell, was first conceptualized in 'The
Development of a Microsimulation Model of Health Manpower Demand and Supply." See Proceed-
ings and Report of Conference on a Health Manpower Simulation Model, Vol.1 (Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of Health Manpower, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, December
1970), pp. 9—172.
Elements of the model and comparisons with the HRRC macroeconometric model were
presented in "Health Manpower Planning: An Econometric Approach," Health Services Re-
search, 7 (1972), pp. 134—147.
Components of the model were presented in "A Microsimulation Model ot the Health Care
System in the United States: The Role of the Physician Services Sector," paper presented at the
5th Conference on pptimization Techniques, Rome, May 1, 1973, published in R. Conti and
A. Ruberfi (editors), 5th Conference on Optimization Techniques, Part!! (Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag, 1974), and in "A Microsimulation Model of the Health Care System: The Role of the
Hospital Sector," paper presented at the TIMS meetings, Tel Aviv, 1973, published in Applied
Mathematics and Computation. 1 (1975), pp. 105—130.
An overview of the model was presented in "A Microeconometric Model of the Health Care
System in the U.S.," paper presented at the Econometric Society Meetings, New York, December
29, 1973, published in Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 4/3 (1975), pp. 407—433.
The complete model wilt be published as A Forecasting and Policy Simulation Model of the
Health Care Sector: The HRRC Prototype Microeconometric Mode! (Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1977).
All publications are by the four authors listed above.
2.For another treatment of NHI, using a macroeconometric model, see D. E. Yell, L. Drabek, M. D.
Intriligator, and L. J. Kimbell, "Econometric Forecasts of Health Services and Health Manpower"
in M. Perlman (editor), The Economics of Health and Medical Care (London: Macmillan, 1974).
This paper identifies and treats several differeni features of alternative NHI plans, including
not only payment features (coinsurance, deductibles, etc.) but also training and reorganization
features, such as the expansion of medical schools and the development of health maintenance
organizations (1-IMO's), respectively.
3.In addition, there is a population of hospitals in the HRRC microeconometric model.
4.FF also appropriately treat nonmonetary costs in their specification of demand functions.
5.Production function estimates are adopted from Larry J. Kimbell and John H. Loranl, "Produc-
tion Functions for Physicians' Services," paper presented at the Econometric Society Meetings,
December 1972. Demand functions for aides were derived from estimates in Michael D.
Intriligator and Barbara H. Kehrer, "A Simultaneous Equations Model of Allied Health Personnel
Employed in Physicians' Offices," in M. Perlman (editor), The Economics of Health and Medical
Care (London: Macmillan, 1974).
6.The are the only coefficients of the HRRC microeconometric model that are not explicitly
estimated. They constitute fewer than 1/10 of 1 per cent of the parameters in the model.
7.Health conditions are used in the demand functions, but they are not maintained in the
population simulation of the HRRC microeconometric model.
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12 1 RE PLY
FinaUy,
care was o
Martin Feldstein and Bernard Friedman for sugges
The comments of Chiswick and Intriligator suggest to us that we did not
adequately emphasize the role of stochastic microsimulation. Although our
model and the HRRC model discussed by Intriligator are both described as NOTE
"microsimulation" studies, ours alone uses a stochastic simulation of indi-
vidual behavior. The HRRC model might better be called a "detailed" or 1We had
"disaggregated" macrosimulation model since no allowance is made for although I
variations in individual experience within demographic groups. invalidau
The stochastic simulation method is particularly important for studying the
effects of different insurance structures. Changes in deductibles, in upper
limits, and in coinsurance rates affect the mean costs and benefits of
insurance in complex and nonlinear ways that depend on the distribution of
health expenditures and not just on the mean of that distribution. We see no
adequate method of comparing, say, a $200 deductible and a $400 deducti-
ble without a model that contains information on the proportion of expenses
below $200 and between $200 and $400. We therefore feel that the HRAC
model cannot be used to analyze the types of policy alternatives with which
we are concerned. Similarly, we do not understand Chiswick's remark that "it
is not clear that an aggregate model of demand would necessarily be a
worse predictor than a microsimulation model."
The two alternative specifications of supply and price response are very
aggregate and very simple. Greater disaggregation would clearly be desira-
bleifreliable parameter estimates were available.1 We see no reason,
however, to provide a stochastic model of supplies behavior.
Although we made no attempt to deal with the time path of the system's
response to a change in demand, it is not true that we do not "directly treat
disequilibrium phenomena in the relevant markets," as lntriligator says. In
Section 4 we explicitly consider the possibilities of excess demand, describe
a "supply-determined" equilibrium, and, in Equation (10), posit a model of
rationing behavior,
Chiswick correctly points out that our simulations assume no cross-
elasticities of demand, no income elasticity, and the same price elasticities
for all individuals. Although we obviously agree with Chiswick that these are
reasonable assumptions, they should be borne in mind in considering the
specific empirical results. These restrictions are, of course, not inherent in the
microsimulation method. Equations (1) and (2) explicitly allow for cross-
elasticities of demand. The first sentence in Section 1 indicates that separate
demand equations can be specified for each income and demographic
group. The original simulations prepared as part of a study for the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare did use these features to examine the
540
IFeldstein and Friedmanimplications of alternative income elasticities and different sets of demand
parameters.
Finally, we recognize that our treatment of the nonmonetary costs of health
care was only a first attempt at a difficult problem. We are grateful to Chiswick
an for suggesting ways to extend and improve our specification.
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I